Government watchdog groups and the government itself have shown concern about the "revolving door" of employees moving from Congress to private lobbying organizations. As of yet, the academic literature analyzing who becomes a revolving door lobbyist is small but growing. We contribute to this literature by examining which former members of Congress become lobbyists. We construct a dataset of all members of Congress who left the institution between 1976 and 2012, identifying those who go on to register as lobbyists. We observe several trends. Among these: there is not a significant difference in the rates at which former House members and senators become lobbyists; institutional standing (in the form of party leadership and other such positions) has a profound effect on which former House members become lobbyists, but less so among former senators; and there is some evidence that Republican former senators are more likely to become lobbyists than Democratic former senators, but this party difference is virtually absent among former House members.
In the context of lobbying, the phrase "revolving door" refers to the phenomenon of highlevel government employees -including members of Congress, the staffers who work for them and members of the executive branch -leaving their jobs in government and becoming lobbyists.
As lobbyists, former policymakers and their employees attempt to influence current policymakers -those who were, until recently, the newly minted lobbyists' colleagues. This trend is disconcerting to many political observers because people who leave government to become lobbyists may provide their new employer unusually good access to their former colleagues or they may carry to the private sector insider information about government operations that gives them an unfair advantage in their lobbying efforts (e.g., Holman 2007;
Leech 2013).
Various scholars have studied the "revolving door" since Gormley (1979) initially examined the behavior of FEC commissioners who had previously worked in the broadcast industry. In response to the recent acceleration of Congress members and congressional staff becoming lobbyists, however, focus on the topic has increased (e.g., Vidal et al 2012 , LaPira and Thomas 2014 , Baumgartner et al 2009 . This article adds to the growing body of research by asking which former members of Congress are most likely to become lobbyists. Specifically, we identify all members of Congress who left the chamber between 1976 and 2012 and observe which ones subsequently registered with the House and Senate as a lobbyist. We estimate this variable in order to understand the effect various factors have on members' propensity to become lobbyists. These factors include members' institutional position in the Congress, ideology, and the time they depart Congress. Our results indicate that institutional position has a significant effect on which Congress members become lobbyists, although the effect is stronger and more consistent in the House than in the Senate. Party membership and ideology have significant effects, although not consistently and not always in the manner we predict. Finally, in addition to the main analysis, we take a closer look at those members of Congress who become lobbyists, examining whom they work for upon leaving office and how long they wait after leaving Congress to begin lobbying.
The Revolving Door
Congressional experience is highly valuable to those who make a living trying to persuade members and their staff. Working on Capitol Hill gives employees an understanding of the multiple and competing demands placed on congressional offices, knowledge about which arguments are likely to be most effective with members, a sense of where to draw the ethical line, and especially for legislative assistants, policy expertise. Additionally, former members and staffers are more likely to know important details, such as which staffers are pivotal on a given issue, personal information about members and senior staff that may be the key to initiating a conversation or professional relationship, and members' true opinions on specific issues (as opposed to the preferences they choose to reveal to constituents or party leaders).
Those who fear "the revolving door" are primarily concerned about this kind of personal information: Is it fair that some lobbyists have an ongoing relationship with a member of Congress that they can leverage to learn the member's true feelings about the issue of the day?
Former staff members can maintain connections to their former office and beyond, such as their bosses' committees and staffers from other offices within the state delegation. For their part, former members of Congress know just where to go to run into current members, and if they can avoid registering as a lobbyist, 1 they can frequent the members-only gym and even the chamber floor.
Recent studies suggest that lobbying firms may be motivated to hire revolvers primarily to pursue access. Vidal et al (2012) find that the salaries of staffers-turned-lobbyists vary with the fates of their former congressional employers: lobbyists with previous experience in a Senate office see a 24 percent decrease in income when the senator for whom they formerly worked leaves the chamber. LaPira and Thomas (2014) find that revolvers tend to have clients from a more diverse set of economic sectors than nonrevolvers, which -given the extensive network of personal and professional connections which come from working in Congress -suggests that they are hired primarily for access rather than policy expertise. Bertrand et al (2011) argue that lobbying is driven more by personal connections than by expertise, although lobbyists themselves argue that their personal connections are less important than their substantive knowledge (Salisbury et al. 1989; Heinz et al 1997) . Indeed, access and expertise are not mutually exclusive -lobbying firms may be motivated by either consideration or both when hiring a revolver. Moreover, the revolvers who provide the highest-level expertise are also likely those who provide the best access, making it difficult to distinguish the two motives. Thus, in this paper we are agnostic as to which motivation, if either, is dominant.
A separate but related strand of recent research indicates that revolving door lobbyists can shape policy outcomes. In a broad survey of issue areas, Baumgartner et al (2009) Third, in both chambers, certain institutional positions confer great amounts of authority, and members of Congress who hold these positions may offer future lobbying employers more access or expertise than "backbenchers" with no special position. We posit that the more institutional authority someone accrues while a member of Congress, the more likely she or he is to become a lobbyist. More powerful members may be seen by potential employers as more likely to become central to networks of other powerful legislators, thus providing better access.
As well, they are more likely to have highly detailed, specialized knowledge of how the legislative process works. From the former members' perspective, those possessing these traits can command higher salaries as lobbyists, and the higher the potential salary, the more attractive lobbying is to members, all else being equal. Thus we predict that committee chairs (Shepsle & Weingast 1987 , Ferejohn 1974 , party leaders (Rohde 1991, Cox and McCubbins 1993) , Fourth, there are two potential ways that a member's party might influence his or her probability of becoming a lobbyist. First, in accordance with the above discussion, members of the majority party have more influence within the chamber than members of the minority party (Rohde 1990, Cox and McCubbins 1993) . (This difference is more pronounced in the House than in the Senate, but it exists in both chambers.) Thus, one hypothesis associated with party membership is that members who are in the majority party when they leave become lobbyists at higher rates than those who are in the minority. On the other hand, the Republican Party is generally seen as more business-friendly than the Democratic Party, and thus Republican members may be more ideologically inclined to become lobbyists and/or have more opportunities extended to them. As a result, a second hypothesis associated with party is that We also take the absolute value of members' DW-NOMINATE scores to examine the effects of ideological extremity (again dividing departing members into quartiles). Here there is a clearer pattern in the House, although it is the opposite of what we predict. Among the first three quartiles, the more ideologically extreme a member is the more likely he or she is to become a lobbyist. This trend drops off in the fourth quartile of extremism, suggesting that the most extreme members might have trouble finding lobbying jobs. Among former senators, there is no clear pattern between ideological extremism and becoming a lobbyist.
Finally, losing an election does not appear to affect a member's likelihood of becoming a lobbyist; the effect is neither statistically significant nor consistent between the two chambers.
Multivariate Analysis
In this section, we present the results of multinomial estimations of the decision by former members of the House and Senate to become lobbyists, examining the same group of departing members as in the above bivariate analyses. The dependent variable being dichotomous, we employ logit as our estimator. The specification of our independent variables is guided both by theories about what makes a member more likely to become a lobbyist (discussed previously) and, at the margins, the results of the bivariate analysis presented above. 7 We also include the number of years of seniority each member has in his or her chamber (logged). Finally we include as control variables members' age as well as age squared owing to the decreased likelihood of career shifts happening as former members get older. Finally, we include a year counter to account for the passage of time. Column 1 presents the estimation of the full sample, while Columns 2 and 3 present results of the equation estimated with just Democrats and just Republicans, respectively. In Column 1, nearly every coefficient is statistically significant in the direction indicated by Figure 2 . The two exceptions are lost last election and Democrat. Aside from these two variables, the results confirm that even when controlling for other influences, each independent variable remains significantly related to the probability of a House member becoming a lobbyist. Extremism is positive and significant, while extremism squared is negative, corroborating the pattern found in the bivariate analysis. Each of the four dummy variables that indicate members' institutional positions is positive and significant. Notably, so is seniority. This is interesting because party leaders, chairs, and members of important committees typically have higher levels of seniority than other members; it could have been the case that either position or seniority causally drove the other's empirical correlation with becoming a lobbyist. However, these results indicate that position and seniority both contribute to the decision to become a lobbyist. Finally, the control variables are statistically significant as well: age has a concave relationship with the probability of becoming a lobbyist, and the year counter is positive and strongly significant. varies from moderate to conservative or liberal) is not significant either. However, seniority and age are significantly related to whether a former member becomes a lobbyist. Among
Republicans, extremism, institutional standing, and seniority are all significant factors. The coefficient on extremism is negative and significant, indicating that as extremism scores get higher and members get more ideological (conservative) they are less likely to become lobbyists.
The institutional standing variables and seniority are, once again, positive and significant. Table 2 ). But, in addition, it may relate to the different distributions of chamber authority in the two chambers. Above we posit that the more power a member has in a chamber the more likely she is to become a lobbyist. In the House, power is concentrated in relatively few hands, making certain key individuals more important within the chamber and thus more likely to become lobbyists upon retirement. In the Senate, on the other hand, power is distributed much more evenly; for example, each individual senator is able to stop legislative action on a bill or nomination by placing a "hold" on it. Power in this chamber is thus less dependent on institutional positioning or seniority. This may explain why only one of the four institutional position variables is significant (party leader), and seniority is strongly significant and negative. (This is true even after controlling for age.) Thus institutional positioning, be it formal or informal, appears to have little to do with the probability with which a former senator becomes a lobbyist.
The same appears to be true for both party and ideology, as neither Democrat nor DW-NOMINATE is significant. This comes as a surprise, based on the significant bivariate relationship each has with the dependent variable, identified in Table 3 . One potential cause of this non-finding is multi-collinearity: these two variables are correlated at r=.85, which may be inflating standard errors. We check for this in two ways. First, we re-run the model in Column 1, dropping first Democrat and then DW-NOMINATE. In both cases, the variable that remains in the equation is still not significantly related to former senators' likelihood of becoming a lobbyist.
Second, Democrat is not included in the single-party estimations presented in Columns 2 and 3, and here DW-NOMINATE is still not significant. Thus the null finding here appears robust:
when controlling for other factors, neither party nor ideology appears to explain much variation in terms of which senators become lobbyists, once other factors are accounted for.
Once again the single-party estimations reveal some differences between Democrats and
Republicans. Democratic former senators appear more influenced than Republican former senators by formal institutional positions: both party leader and committee chair are positive and significant. Also, Democratic former senators are more sensitive to age than Republicans are, as both age and age squared are significant, producing a concave relationship. Among Republicans, none of the institutional position variables are significant, and neither are the age variables. In fact, the only variable significantly related to the likelihood of a Republican former senator's becoming a lobbyist is seniority: both seniority and seniority squared are significant, indicating that even after controlling for age, it is the moderately senior Republicans who are most likely to become lobbyists.
Revolving Door Lobbyists: A closer look
Using data from the Center for Responsive Politics, we record the employer for whom each member of Congress works the first time they file as a lobbyist after leaving Congress. 8 We code these employers into four mutually exclusive categories. The results are displayed in Table 4 ; column 1 presents results for House members and column 2 for senators. Overall, revolvers from both chambers display similar patterns of employment, with only slight differences.
The result that stands out most is that strong majorities from both chambers -78 percent of House revolvers and 87 percent of Senate revolvers -work for lobbying firms upon leaving
Congress. We include in this category any organization that does not lobby the government on its own behalf, but does so on behalf of paying clients, including traditional lobbying firms as well as law firms, management consulting firms, and public relations firms. An additional trend within this category was that a significant number of revolving members during this time do not go to work for previously existing firms, but instead start their own lobbying firms: 23 former senators (28 percent of all revolvers from that chamber) and 74 former House members (23 percent) start their own shops rather joining an existing one. In fact, our focus on members' first employers actually understates this trend somewhat: an additional 10 senators and 26 House members start a lobbying firm after initially lobbying for another employer. All told, 133 of the 407 revolvers in our dataset, or 33 percent, at some point start their own firms.
The remaining revolvers work as in-house lobbyists for one of three different types of organizations: for-profit corporations, trade organizations, or non-profit groups. For both chambers, the largest of these categories is non-profit (8.6 percent House, 8.5 percent Senate), ranging from universities (e.g., Bob Kerry was president of the New School for 9 years after We also examine the number of years that elapse between when a member of Congress leaves the chamber and when he first registers as a lobbyist. A histogram of this variable is shown in Figure 4 . The majority of all revolvers begin lobbying activity either the same year they leave (shown in the figure as years = 0; n=98 or 25 percent) or the next year (years = 1; n=141 or 36 percent). After that, the count drops off dramatically, with 29 revolvers registering after two years, and the N decreasing more or less steadily after that. However, the tail is quite long, with the longest wait time between service in the chamber and registering as a lobbyist being 27 years (Roger Zion, who left the House of Representatives in 1974 and set up a lobbying firm in 2001). Overall, the median number of years members wait before lobbying is 1, and the mean is 3.14. There is no statistically significant difference between the chambers (p<.462).
Rules requiring a "cooling off period" during which a retired member of Congress must wait before lobbying makes it somewhat surprising that the majority of revolvers begin their 
Discussion and Conclusion
This article contributes to the small but growing literature that examines the revolving door phenomenon. LaPira and Thomas (2014) estimate the size of the revolving door lobbyist community, and both Baumgartner et al (2009) and Lazarus and McKay (2012) begin to assess how influential these lobbyists are. But we still have had little idea of who is most likely to become a revolving door lobbyist. This paper addresses that gap by asking the question of which members of Congress are most likely to register as lobbyists after leaving the chamber.
We find that members of the House and Senate are roughly equally likely to become lobbyists after they leave Congress. However, various factors influence the decision differently for members leaving each chamber. Among House members, formal institutional positions and seniority are very important determinants of whether a former member becomes a lobbyist. This is likely because these factors to a large extent determine members' degree of power and influence within the chamber. On the other hand, these factors matter less in the Senate, where rules of procedure produce a flatter distribution of power among senators. Additionally, there is some evidence that party and/or ideology influences the decision of whether or not to lobby after leaving the chamber: the bivariate analysis showed both that Republicans are more likely to lobby than Democrats, and that conservatives are more likely to lobby than liberals, although these relationships are not corroborated by the multivariate analysis. In the House, party does not appear to play a strong role at all, and ideology is influential not through the substance of politics but through ideological extremism: the more extreme a former member is, the more likely she or he is to become a lobbyist -but this is less true for the most extreme former members.
Although this article advances our knowledge of which legislators go through the revolving door, it is only a first step. Further research is needed to address several important questions, many of which concern congressional staffers. Perhaps even more troubling from a normative perspective is the possibility that
Congress members may alter their legislative behavior in their final term or session to become friendlier to the business, industry, or concern that they will lobby for (Rothenberg and Sanders 2000; Kousser, Lewis and Masket 2007) . Voting records, bill introduction patterns, and committee activity are all areas which future employers may be interested in exploiting prior to when the member leaves office. Whether this occurs is yet another open question. However, to the extent that it does occur, being able to predict which members become lobbyists may help voters, journalists, and interest groups to keep these members honest while they are in office. Table 4 Revolving Door Lobbyists ' First Employers, 1976 House 
